@article{oai:osu.repo.nii.ac.jp:00000984,
 author = {平尾, 昌宏 and HIRAO, Masahiro},
 journal = {大阪産業大学論集. 人文・社会科学編},
 month = {Feb},
 note = {P(論文), Schelling examines various definitions of pantheism in his "Freiheitsschrift". One of them is the definition of pantheism as the denial of finite things. Schelling insists that this definition does not adapt to pantheim and spinozism, offering the possibility of the unique interpretation of Spinozism, by identifying finite things in Spinoza's philosophy and the monades of Leibniz. The uniqueness of this interpretation stands out in the history of interpretation of Spinozism in Germany. Hegel and Maimon define spinozism as acosmism, which is the interpretation rejected by Schelling in "Freihetisschrift". Schelling does not refer the term 'acosmism', but many thinkers, for example Platner, Mendeslsohn and Wolf, consider Spinozism as acosmism, or the system affirming only one substance and denying finite things or the world, without using the name of 'acosmism'. We point out that, at first, it is important to acknowledge that Schelling rejects the acosmism-interpretation of spinozism but catches Spinoza's Philosophy in relating to that of Leibniz, since Maimon, Platner, Mendelssohn and Wolf also interprete Spinoza in relation to Leibniz,. But it must be questioned the reason why Schelling rejects the acosmisminterpretation of spinozism. The answer is in the fundamental framework of "Freiheitsschrift" in which Schelling aims integrating idealism and realism. For him, the representative idealism is that of Fichte's 'Wissenschaftslehre", and the typical realism is the philosophy of Spinoza. Spinozism, therefore, must be just realism, for Schelling, to be integrated to the 'real-idealism' by himself.},
 pages = {43--58},
 title = {シェリングと無世界論 : 『自由論』序論部におけるスピノザ観への一評注},
 volume = {5},
 year = {2009},
 yomi = {ヒラオ, マサヒロ}
}